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A B S T R A C T
Many contemporary indigenous movements deploy
strategies of counterglobalization that make
innovative use of the architecture of globalization.
This article examines an indigenous political
movement that took legal action to gain
compensation and limit the environmental impact of
the Ok Tedi copper and gold mine in Papua New
Guinea. Even though the campaign sought to
balance the desire for economic benefits with the
protection of local subsistence practices, its
objectives were frequently misinterpreted.
Indigenous movements that deviate from an
antidevelopment position run the risk of being seen
as greedy rather than green. Instead of reproducing
allegories about the successful exercise of veto
power over development projects, anthropologists
need ethnographic accounts that analyze the
complex ambitions of indigenous movements and the
risks of particular strategies of counterglobalization.
[corporations, environmentalism, globalization, law,
mining, NGOs, Papua New Guinea]
M
any contemporary indigenous movements deploy strategies
of counterglobalization that make innovative use of the archi-
tecture of globalization in challenging the “logic embedded in
the new global order” (Castells 1997:96). Also known as “glob-
alization from below” (Brecher et al. 2000; Falk 1993) or “grass-
roots globalization” (Appadurai 2000), these social movements bridge the
gap between the local and the global as international campaigns piggyback
on specific struggles and local protests hitchhike on global initiatives. The
resulting forms of political mobilization have been described as enacting
a “politics of scale” (Escobar 2001:166). Although recent scholarship has
emphasized the political efficacy of counterglobalization (Appadurai 2000,
2002; Brecher et al. 2000; Escobar 2001; Keck and Sikkink 1998), this article
examines the risks posed to indigenous politics and political movements by
strategies of counterglobalization.1
Counterglobalization operates through transnational action networks
that make international resources available to new categories of actors (Keck
and Sikkink 1998), allowing them to leapfrog politics that have stalemated
at the local or national level. The emergence of the “indigenous” as a legal
category (Anaya 1996; Barsh 1994; Kymlicka 1995) and social movement is a
prime example of this process, opening up new politics and debates about
alternative forms of sovereignty (Brysk 2000; Niezen 2003; Sawyer 2004;
Warren 1998), and stimulating new rights-based claims to culture (Brown
2003; Hirsch and Strathern 2004).2 Paradoxically, however, the pursuit of
autonomy and indigenous rights requires increasing movement and trans-
lation across cultural, political, and geographic boundaries.3
Anthropologists have been attentive to the ways in which these political
engagements have resulted in the “generification of culture” (Errington and
Gewertz 2001) evident in essentialized representations of indigenous peo-
ples. Solidarity among the indigenous participants in these movements is
often based on rhetorical claims to underlying similarities as well as the “in-
version of tradition” (Thomas 1992) through which they define themselves
in opposition to the industrialized West.4 For example, indigenous property
regimes are usually described as collective or communal in contrast to the
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centrality of private property in Western political and legal
traditions, even though anthropologists since Malinowski
(1935:280) have pointed out the reductive nature of this op-
position. The specific objectives of indigenous movements
may also be recast in universal terms when they are incor-
porated into counterglobalization movements that seek to
promote “the common values of democracy, environmental
protection, community, economic justice, quality, and hu-
man solidarity” (Brecher et al. 2000:15).
Anthropologists have also been critical of the ways in
which contemporary social movements share ideas with,
borrow from, or otherwise come to resemble the organiza-
tions they purport to critique. J. Peter Brosius (1997) shows
how forest campaigns in Borneo made use of metropolitan
discourses of identity and the environment. Paul Rabinow
(2002:14) argues that despite the claims of NGOs and multi-
national corporations to occupy opposing positions on the
political spectrum, they operate in terms of the same funda-
mental understandings of the person, life, and ownership. I
have argued that debates about the spread of Euro-American
property regimes reproduce Euro-American conceptions of
the body, nature, and culture (Kirsch 2004c). Annelise Riles
(2000) shows how the knowledge practices of NGOs depend
on the same legal and bureaucratic forms of documentation
as the organizations they critique.
Like these scholars, I am interested in how the practices
of translation, accommodation, and opposition may impose
constraints on indigenous movements. In this article, how-
ever, I argue that anthropologists also need to pay greater
attention to how the other parties to these engagements—
including states and their legal systems, corporations, the
media, and members of the academy—actively shape these
discursive practices. As Brosius has noted, “National elites
and transnational corporate interests . . . are engaged in at-
tempts to displace the moral/political imperatives that gal-
vanize movements with a conspicuously institutional ap-
paratus that is by turns legal, financial, bureaucratic, and
technoscientific” (1999:278). He suggests that anthropolo-
gists have the responsibility to “bring a critical perspective
to bear on the discursive foundations of such efforts and
show how, in the process, various structures of domination
are constituted and perpetuated” (Brosius 1999:278).
The strategy of counterglobalization has both advan-
tages and disadvantages. Effective political mobilization of
indigenous movements often requires collaboration with
a range of NGOs. In campaigns against transnational cor-
porations, these alliances can replicate the geographic dis-
tribution of capital by putting pressure on the corporation
wherever it operates. Although the participants in these cam-
paigns may be relatively few and far between, their cumu-
lative influence may nonetheless be significant. Whereas
operating in remote locations once afforded corporations
freedom from scrutiny, activists harnessing new commu-
nications technologies ranging from the Internet and cell
phones to satellite imaging are now able to track and moni-
tor corporate activity in approximately real time wherever it
occurs.
However, strategic alliances with NGOs, which possess
their own political agendas and constituencies, may result
in significant compromises for indigenous movements. In
particular, the need to communicate in the discourses of
their partners can be a liability (Conklin 1997; Conklin and
Graham 1995). For example, indigenous activists risk hav-
ing their testimony dismissed as inauthentic when they
use scientific terminology to express environmental con-
cerns (Innes 2001; Strathern 2003:269–270), much like Laura
Graham (2002) observes for indigenous leaders in Latin
America when they express their political views in the lan-
guage of the dominant group.5 Pursuit of social justice claims
through the legal system is also fraught with problems of
translation, as I describe below (see also Povinelli 2002).
Another challenge faced by indigenous activists is the
speed with which capital now appropriates the terms of its
critique (Latour 2004) and the strategies of its critics.6 Corpo-
rations have co-opted the discourse of sustainability to pro-
mote their contributions to economic development (Crook
2004), the language of accountability and transparency is
used by conservative organizations like the American Enter-
prise Institute to police NGOs (Kirsch 2004a), and social re-
sponsibility is cited as a premise of corporate audit culture
(Welker 2006). A recent satirical film about environmental
activism received corporate sponsorship (Sydney Morning
Herald 2006), turning the tables on liberal exposés of cor-
porate behavior, and corporations regularly establish faux
grassroots organizations to respond to their critics and facil-
itate negotiations with landowners (Sawyer 2004), a process
known as “astroturfing” (New York Times 2007: A22).7
The vulnerability of indigenous movements to exter-
nal criticism often takes the form of limited choices, in-
cluding pressure to position themselves as antidevelopment.
This problem is also reproduced in the anthropological lit-
erature on indigenous movements, including Anna Tsing’s
(2005:205–228) recent description of a forest movement in
Indonesia. She finds that the different groups involved in a
forest campaign in South Kalimantan, whom she identifies
as village leaders, nature lovers, and national activists, at-
tributed their success in stopping a logging project to com-
pletely unrelated events. Tsing argues that the movement
was effective not because the parties shared a common
agenda but, instead, because of the value added by their
differences to the movement’s division of labor. However,
Tsing did not directly observe the forest campaign and chose
not to conduct further research to determine how the log-
ging project was stopped. Rather, she elected to treat these
events allegorically.8 Her choice of examples reflects the ten-
dency among NGOs and anthropologists alike to focus on
movements that seek to block development.9 The problem
with concentrating on the successful veto of development
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projects is that this neglects analysis of more complicated
scenarios in which alternative outcomes are sought. Treating
the Indonesian forest campaign allegorically also conceals
the strategies by which these movements actually achieve
their goals.
In contrast, in this article I pay careful attention to these
issues in relation to alliances between indigenous peoples
and NGOs that seek to mitigate the negative social and
environmental impacts of the mining industry. These en-
gagements have occurred with greater frequency over the
last few decades as mining companies move into less ac-
cessible regions of the world, exploiting new ore deposits
to supply the expanding global economy. These are often
marginal spaces in which indigenous peoples retain con-
trol over lands that were not previously seen to have value
and where development was historically limited or absent.
Neoliberal reforms have facilitated the investment of for-
eign capital in these new mining projects while simultane-
ously dismantling regulatory regimes designed to protect
labor, the environment, and the rights of persons displaced
or otherwise affected by mining. During the last decade, the
mining industry has also become increasingly proactive in
response to opposition from alliances between indigenous
peoples and NGOs focused on the environment and human
rights.
The Ok Tedi campaign
My interest in these questions stems from nearly two
decades of ethnographic research and participation in a so-
cial movement that sought to receive compensation for and
to impose limits on the environmental impact of the Ok Tedi
copper and gold mine in Papua New Guinea (Kirsch 2002a,
2006). Since the mid-1980s, the mine has discharged more
than one billion metric tons of tailings, the finely ground
material that remains after the valuable metal has been ex-
tracted, and waste rock into the Ok Tedi and Fly rivers, caus-
ing massive environmental degradation downstream.
Ok Tedi was the first mining project approved by the
postcolonial government of Papua New Guinea, which ac-
quired its independence from Australia in 1975. The flag-
ship project of the colonial era was the Panguna copper
mine in Bougainville, which continued to provide more
than 10 percent of the postcolonial state’s revenues (Griffin
1990:70). After independence, Papua New Guinea contin-
ued the colonial policy of pursuing economic development
through large-scale resource extraction projects (Filer and
Macintyre 2006). The majority shareholder and managing
partner of the Ok Tedi mine was the Australian corporation
Broken Hill Proprietary, Ltd. (BHP). BHP’s involvement with
the Ok Tedi mine, which cost $1.4 billion to construct, initi-
ated a period of rapid internationalization for the corpora-
tion, culminating in its 2001 merger with the South African
mining company Billiton.10 BHP Billiton currently operates
in 25 countries and describes itself as the “world’s largest
diversified resources company” (BHP Billiton 2006).
The high price of gold during the early 1980s resulted in
an optimistic economic forecast for the Ok Tedi mine. The
first gold was poured in 1984 and copper production began
in 1986.11 Although the original environmental impact as-
sessment called for the construction of a tailings dam in the
mountains, a landslide at the construction site led the gov-
ernment to temporarily permit the discharge of tailings and
other mine wastes directly into the Ok Tedi River (Hyndman
1988; Townsend 1988). When opposition to the social and
environmental impacts of the Panguna mine in Bougainville
led to its violent closure in 1989, the resulting economic pres-
sure led the state to approve BHP’s request to continue op-
erating the Ok Tedi mine using riverine tailings disposal.
Protests against the Ok Tedi mine began in the late 1980s
as the trees along the Ok Tedi River became affected by pol-
lution and gardens along the river floodplain were destroyed
by mine tailings. I typed several petitions demanding com-
pensation for the environmental impact of the mine that
were written by the Yonggom people living in the village on
the Ok Tedi River where I conducted ethnographic research
from 1987 to 1989 (see Banks and Ballard 1997: app. 2). After
completing my dissertation research, I helped to call atten-
tion to the emerging environmental crisis in newspapers and
on the radio, and through reports published in Papua New
Guinea and Australia. As long as the protests against the Ok
Tedi mine remained local, however, they failed to achieve
their objective: The petitions disappeared into government
file cabinets, the mine offered water tanks and small-scale
development projects in lieu of tailings containment, and
although university students protested against government
policies, they were unable to alter the status quo.
During interviews that I conducted in 1992 for a social
impact study sponsored by the Ok Tedi mine (see Filer 2001),
the broad consensus among the people living in the villages
along the lower Ok Tedi River was that the mining company
should stop discharging mine tailings into their river system
(Kirsch 1995). In one village, the people I spoke with told me
that they wanted the mine to stop polluting their river and
to compensate them for the damage to their environment.
Otherwise, they wanted the mine to close because of its neg-
ative impact on the quality of their lives. They intended to
seek a political solution to these problems by enlisting the
members of local “pressure groups” or NGOs rather than re-
sorting to violence like the people of Bougainville. In another
village, the people I interviewed told me that “they [the min-
ing company] do not know what we are feeling down here.
We are hungry, we are angry, and we are not happy about
the pollution. We do not want to shut down the mine, we
just want them to build a tailings dam.” I was also told that
the mine should not have begun production before devising
a way to safely dispose of the tailings, a perspective equiv-
alent to the precautionary principle. Because they felt that
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pollution from the mine had already “spoiled” their land,
however, they wanted the mining company to continue op-
erating so that it could compensate them for the damages
they had already incurred.
Counterglobalization and Ok Tedi
When the campaign against the Ok Tedi mine went global
in the early 1990s, it sought to make visible the ordinarily
concealed movement of capital and minerals. Represen-
tatives from the communities affected by the mine trav-
eled throughout Europe and the Americas. The London-
based NGO Minewatch and the Wau Ecology Institute of
Papua New Guinea brought several political activists from
the area to testify against BHP at the 1992 International
Water Tribunal in Amsterdam, which recommended that the
mine should either implement tailings containment or close
(International Water Tribunal 1994). The provincial govern-
ment sponsored a delegation to the 1992 “Earth Summit”
in Rio de Janeiro, where a Yonggom speaker addressed the
media during a press conference held on board the Green-
peace ship Rainbow Warrior II in the Rio harbor.12 With the
assistance of a metals trader on Wall Street who had be-
come alarmed by reports about the environmental impacts
of the Ok Tedi mine, two members of the provincial dele-
gation also met with environmental organizations in New
York and Washington, D.C., to discuss Amoco’s 30 percent
share in the project.13 However, the NGOs decided not to
campaign against Amoco, citing the difficulty of attracting
public support for political action focused on the minority
shareholder of a copper and gold mine located in a distant
country that is largely unfamiliar to most Americans.14 The
Lutheran Church of Germany also invited several of the key
political actors from the affected area to meet with mem-
bers of the Bundestag, which subsequently adopted a mo-
tion recommending that the federal government use its in-
fluence on the German shareholders of the mining company
to promote compliance with Western environmental stan-
dards and payment of appropriate economic compensation
(Schoell 1994).15 By forging connections between widely dis-
persed locations, the campaign against the Ok Tedi mine
exemplified the strategy of globalization from below.
The campaign against the Ok Tedi mine was virtually
unprecedented at the time, for, unlike the petroleum indus-
try, which engages with consumers at the pump, there is no
direct interface between mining companies and the public.
Until recently, this allowed the mining industry to remain
among the least visible of corporate powers. The major in-
novation of the campaign against the Ok Tedi mine was to
leverage protests with legal action that simultaneously af-
fected multiple corporate pressure points: shareholder con-
cerns, BHP’s public reputation, and the mining company’s
ability to sell copper in the global marketplace. Following
their successful appearance before the International Wa-
ter Tribunal, which lacked the power to enforce its judg-
ment, the Yonggom and their neighbors decided to take the
Ok Tedi mine to court. In September 1994, the Australian
lawyers Slater and Gordon filed suit against Ok Tedi Min-
ing, Ltd. (OTML) and BHP in the Victorian Supreme Court in
Melbourne, where BHP is incorporated.16 The litigation rep-
resented 30,000 people affected by the environmental im-
pact of the Ok Tedi mine.
Only by confronting BHP in the international arena were
the Yonggom and their neighbors able to force the min-
ing company to respond to their concerns. At the invita-
tion of the Dene Nation in Canada’s Northwest Territories, a
Yonggom leader and a lawyer from Slater and Gordon trav-
eled to Yellowknife to attend public hearings being held to
review BHP’s bid to operate a billion-dollar diamond min-
ing concession.17 Disseminating information about the en-
vironmental problems caused by the Ok Tedi mine helped
to deter BHP’s copper prospect in the Caribbean island
of Dominica (Nader 1996). A meeting was scheduled with
the operators of a copper smelter in Japan to request that
they find an alternative source of raw material. The coun-
terglobalization movement successfully challenged one of
Australia’s largest and most powerful corporations by turn-
ing the conduits through which capital ordinarily flows into
pathways for protest.
Capital strikes back
In Papua New Guinea, the question whether the Ok Tedi
mine represented progress and a desirable form of develop-
ment or an environmental tragedy in the making was the
subject of heated national debate. At a conference on envi-
ronmental issues held in the capital of Port Moresby in 1993
(see Gladman et al. 1996), the senior Papua New Guinean
executive at the Ok Tedi mine argued that polluting the river
was an acceptable trade-off if the citizens of the country were
to achieve their goal of wearing shirts and neckties and hav-
ing office jobs like Australians.18 The audience disrupted his
speech with catcalls, and a representative from Greenpeace
yelled out that the only reason a real Melanesian would need
a necktie would be to hang himself. However, no one at the
conference objected when the positive contributions of the
mine were subsequently described as bringing progress to
an area in which local inhabitants were lacking skills and
knowledge. The audience members, including two Yonggom
men from villages on the Ok Tedi River, did not challenge the
way that the discourse of development devalues the ecologi-
cal knowledge and skills required for subsistence production
(see West 2006:179–180).19
In addition to its attempt to influence national opinion,
BHP colluded with the Papua New Guinea government in
efforts to undermine the lawsuit against the Ok Tedi mine.
In actions that resulted in a September 1995 judgment of
contempt by the Supreme Court of Victoria, which was later
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overturned on a technicality, lawyers acting on behalf of BHP
helped the Papua New Guinea Parliament draft legislation
that would subject the individual plaintiffs to fines of up to
$75,000 (Gordon 1997:157). The fines would also apply to
anyone who sought to challenge the constitutionality of the
legislation in the Papua New Guinea courts. The proposed
bill met with considerable international disapprobation, in-
cluding the wrath of Ralph Nader (1996), who was traveling in
Australia on behalf of the Green Party at the time. Nonethe-
less, the Papua New Guinea Parliament subsequently passed
the Compensation (Prohibition of Foreign Legal Proceed-
ings) Act of 1995, which prohibited “the taking or pursuing
in foreign courts of legal proceedings in relation to compen-
sation claims arising from mining projects and petroleum
projects in Papua New Guinea” (Independent State of Papua
New Guinea 1995a:1). The Compensation Act invoked na-
tional sovereignty to achieve the goals of the earlier proposal.
However, the lead plaintiffs in the Ok Tedi case refused to be
deterred by the criminalization of their legal action.
BHP also attempted to divide the plaintiffs in the legal
proceedings against the mining company. The Mining (Ok
Tedi Restated Eighth Supplemental Agreement) Act of 1995
established a general compensation fund of K110 million
(worth approximately $82 million at the time) for the people
negatively impacted by the Ok Tedi mine (Independent State
of Papua New Guinea 1995b).20 However, the agreement re-
quired the 30,000 plaintiffs in the case to choose between
monetary compensation and continued participation in the
litigation in Australia. The choice was deceptive, however,
because the agreement stipulated that the compensation
payments could be reduced or eliminated altogether to pay
for any additional expenditure on tailings containment re-
quired by the government of Papua New Guinea. In other
words, the people affected by the mine could be forced to
pay for these environmental controls out of the compensa-
tion that they had been promised. Nonetheless, the majority
of the plaintiffs eventually opted out of the lawsuit, which
had no guarantee of success in court, in favor of immediate
monetary compensation. BHP deployed the same tactic sev-
eral years later to undermine a second round of legal action
against the operators of the Ok Tedi mine, as I describe below.
Settling Ok Tedi
At first, we didn’t say anything to the company or to the
government.
We were worried about our gardens and the river, but
we had no idea how to fight against the mine, because
we are not educated people.
Initially, I questioned [Rex Dagi and Alex Maun, the lead
plaintiffs in the lawsuit]:
“What are you going to do about our land and our river?”
I asked them that.
They answered me: “We’ll take them to court [and solve
the problem].”
So we really supported the lawsuit . . .
I was opposed to the government’s attempt to make us
accept the [compensation package] because of the dam-
age to the environment . . .
We backed the lawsuit instead . . .
I’m very proud of the lawsuit and
I praise Rex and Alex for taking the matter to court and
winning the case. [Dome village, August 1996]
The unfavorable publicity generated by the legal proceed-
ings and the internationalization of protests against the min-
ing company led to an out-of-court settlement in May 1996.
The lawyers for the plaintiffs had also been pushed toward
the settlement by corporate maneuver: The establishment
of the general compensation fund substantially reduced the
number of litigants in the case and financial pressures were
mounting on the plaintiffs’ legal representation, whereas
BHP had far deeper pockets. With an estimated value of $500
million in compensation and commitments to tailings con-
tainment, this was one of the largest settlements of an en-
vironmental tort claim ever negotiated and was hailed as a
significant victory for the plaintiffs.21
However, cautionary flags were raised almost immedi-
ately after the terms of the settlement were made public.
Nader (1996) warned that the agreement failed to guarantee
that the necessary infrastructure for tailings containment
would be constructed. One of the lead plaintiffs in the case
expressed concern that the mining company might continue
to discharge tailings into the river despite the terms of the
settlement and stressed the need for long-term economic
opportunities in contrast to the short-term economic ben-
efits of cash compensation (Maun 1997:11). I warned that
the company might delay the implementation of tailings
containment by continuing to call for additional scientific
research and engineering studies, or by hiding behind the
government’s reluctance to pay its share of the costs (Kirsch
1997b:139).
The monetary component of the settlement extended
eligibility for a share of the K110-million compensation fund
established by the Restated Eighth Supplemental Agreement
to all of the members of the affected class, instead of only
those persons who had previously opted out of the legal
proceedings.22 It also guaranteed that these funds will be
paid out in their entirety and can no longer be diverted to
pay for tailings containment. A second compensation fund
of K40 million was established on behalf of the people living
along the lower Ok Tedi River, where the impact of the mine
had been the most pronounced. Finally, the settlement re-
quired the mining company to transfer a 10 percent equity
share in the mine to the Papua New Guinea government to
be held in trust on behalf of the people of Western Province.
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The central feature of the settlement, however, was the
corporate commitment to tailings containment. At the time
of the settlement, the most likely option was thought to be
a tailings pipeline from the mine site in the mountains to a
lowland storage area that would eventually cover between 30
and 50 square kilometers, although this land could be pro-
gressively rehabilitated. The estimated cost of the pipeline
was between $180 and $250 million plus several million dol-
lars per year in operating costs. Finally, the mining company
agreed to establish an environmental rehabilitation program
for deforested land along the Ok Tedi River.
The settlement of the case ratified the principle of for-
eign direct liability, which contends that corporations should
be held accountable to the laws of the countries in which
they are incorporated for their actions abroad. The Ok Tedi
case was an important forerunner of this legal strategy and
a number of similar cases are currently before the courts
in the United States and the United Kingdom (Chesterman
2004).23
Too late to save the Ok Tedi River?
In 1999, OTML released the results of the waste management
studies that it was required to conduct under the terms of
the 1996 agreement. However, the mining company claimed
that none of the proposed strategies for tailings containment
would substantially mitigate the environmental processes
already in motion. The reports indicated that even if min-
ing were to stop immediately, the environmental problems
downstream will continue to increase given the sheer vol-
ume of tailings already in the river system and ongoing ero-
sion from waste rock dumps in the mountains (Parametrix,
Inc., and URS Greiner Woodward Clyde 1999). Pollution from
the mine will have a cascading effect as it gradually migrates
downstream toward the Gulf of Papua, leaving deforestation
in its wake. The most recent reports from the mining com-
pany acknowledge that the heavy accumulation of sediment
in the lower Ok Tedi River will continue for another 60 years,
while the impact on the middle Fly River may last for several
hundred years (OTML 2005:12).
When the lawsuit was filed in 1994, the total area of
rain forest that was already dead or under severe stress was
less than 50 square kilometers (Burton 1997:39). The dam-
age has increased substantially in the intervening years, and
more than 1,554 square kilometers of rain forest is currently
affected by pollution from the mine. The impacted area is
expected to increase to 3,000 square kilometers and may
eventually cover the entire floodplain of the river, or 4,200
square kilometers (OTML 2005:4). Local species composi-
tion is not expected to return to conditions before the mine,
with grassland and wetlands replacing much of the affected
rain forest (Chapman et al. 2000:17).
In lieu of halting riverine tailings disposal, OTML insti-
tuted a dredging program in the Ok Tedi River at an annual
cost of $30 million. This lowers the riverbed in the lower Ok
Tedi River and reduces flooding into the adjacent forests.
However, it only removes about half of the tailings or fines
produced by the mine, and only about 20 percent of the total
volume of waste material discharged into the river system.
By the time that the mining company studies were made
public in 1999, three years after the out-of-court settlement,
many of the Yonggom people whom I interviewed had be-
come discouraged about the prospect of saving the Ok Tedi
River. They were skeptical about the viability of the tailings
pipeline and questioned other possible interventions. One
person from a village along the river remarked to me in an
interview, “What is growing along the riverbanks now? Just
pitpit [bush asparagus], elephant grass, and softwood trees.
Why protect them? They can grow anywhere. If we were
talking about hardwood forests and animals, that would be
different. But now? It’s not worth protecting what is here.”
During a village meeting held in Dome, where I was based
during my original fieldwork, I was told that “by the time
that the company implements their plans [for tailings con-
tainment], it will almost be time for the mine to close . . . It
would be better to [just] give us the money . . . because the
river is already dead and the land and the creeks are already
ruined.” Another person told me, “If it is safe [for the people
living here], then they should continue to dump tailings into
the river. . . . They can never fix this river—it is already dead.
They should give us that money [for tailings containment]
instead. By the time that there are results [from any tailings
containment scheme], the mine will almost be closed.”
However, the mining company’s claim that none of the
proposed strategies would substantially mitigate the envi-
ronmental impact of the mine was subsequently challenged
by the peer review group assembled by OTML. The peer re-
view group argued that the mining company had systemat-
ically underestimated the potential benefits of the various
tailings containment options (Chapman et al. 2000:14–15),
which was consistent with corporate reluctance to pay for
these costly projects. The peer review also concluded that
the mine reports underestimated the difference that early
mine closure would make to the extent and duration of the
impacts downstream (Chapman et al. 2000:14). The World
Bank, which provided loan guarantees to the project dur-
ing its initial capitalization in the early 1980s, also carried
out a review of the mine reports at the request of the prime
minister of Papua New Guinea. The World Bank (2000:21)
noted that the corporate reports only evaluated a limited
number of responses to the problems downstream from the
mine, some of which were not even feasible, such as closing
the mine immediately, which would have destabilizing eco-
nomic consequences at both the local and national level. In
addition, the mine reports ignored other legitimate options,
such as substantially reducing production rates. The pes-
simistic attitudes of the Yonggom people with whom I spoke
toward potential tailings containment options also failed to
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take into account the importance of preventing the problems
along the Ok Tedi River from spreading further downstream
along the Fly River.
Exit BHP
The public release of the mining company studies led the
managing director of OTML to admit that the environmental
impacts of the Ok Tedi mine were far greater than previously
predicted (OTML 1999).24 In its evaluation of the mining
company reports, the World Bank (2000:21) recommended
that the Ok Tedi mine close after implementing programs
to facilitate the social transition to life after the mine. The
failure of the mining company to take action on tailings
containment prompted the plaintiffs in the original lawsuit
to return to the Victorian Supreme Court in Melbourne in
April 2000, charging BHP with breach of contract.
BHP responded to the 1999 reports by announcing that
the Ok Tedi mine was “not compatible with our environ-
mental values” (Barker and Oldfield 1999). Pressure from
the new legal action and the negative publicity associated
with its management of the Ok Tedi mine, as well as on-
going merger talks with Billiton, led to BHP’s decision to
withdraw from the mine. However, the government of Papua
New Guinea, which depends on the Ok Tedi mine for 18
percent of its foreign exchange earnings, insisted that the
mine continue operating until the ore body is exhausted in
2013. The Mining (Ok Tedi Ninth Supplemental Agreement)
Act of 2001 established the conditions for BHP Billiton’s de-
parture from the Ok Tedi mine, which continues to operate
independently. In February 2002, BHP Billiton transferred
its 52 percent share in the mine to a trust fund company
based in Singapore called the PNG Sustainable Development
Program, Ltd., which will support development projects in
Papua New Guinea.25 The Mineral Policy Institute in Sydney
described the new trust company as a “poisoned chalice”
because it relies on the continued operation of the mine and
additional destruction of the environment to pay for devel-
opment (Evans 2002). The primary purpose of the trust com-
pany, however, is to provide BHP Billiton and the Papua New
Guinea government with indemnity from future claims re-
lating to loss from pollution or damage to the environment
as a result of the mine’s continued operation. In addition, the
Mining Act provides the new operators of the Ok Tedi mine
with unprecedented authority to establish the environmen-
tal standards for its operation as well as the procedures for
monitoring and compliance, which has been described as an
extraordinary transfer of rights from the public to the private
sector (Divecha 2001).
The Ninth Supplemental Agreement also legalized new
arrangements between the mine and the affected commu-
nities, known as the Community Mine Continuation Agree-
ments (CMCAs). A key provision of the CMCAs was the re-
quirement that the plaintiffs “opt out” of continuing legal
action against the mine to become eligible for additional
compensation. Like the general compensation fund that
alienated plaintiffs in the first lawsuit, the CMCAs used the
promise of additional compensation to weaken the new le-
gal action against BHP. In an independent report commis-
sioned by the Oxfam Community Aid Abroad (Australia), the
CMCAs were described as “a legal means to contain and con-
trol through negotiations, any blow out in the magnitude of
compensation claims pursued through the courts” (Kalinoe
2003:24).
BHP Billiton also engaged an Australian public relations
firm to mitigate negative publicity associated with its depar-
ture from Papua New Guinea and the Ok Tedi mine. Offor
Sharp described its intervention in the following terms:
Our client had on its hands 25 volumes of scientific
reports that told a story of widespread environmental
damage to one of Papua New Guinea’s largest river sys-
tems. The damage would be worse than previously told
to the public by the company’s majority shareholder.
The challenge was to release the results of the risk as-
sessment into a highly sensitised and critical public
arena in a way that minimised damage to the corpo-
rate reputations of each of the company’s sharehold-
ers. At the same time, it needed to respect the peo-
ple whose environment and lives would be changed by
the increased damage. . . . We delivered a tightly con-
trolled and highly strategic public release to diverse
and often aggressive stakeholders in PNG, Australia and
the US. Media coverage was limited because direct en-
gagement over the complexity of the issues meant few
critics were prepared to provide media comment. As
a result of the release strategy, there was no civil un-
rest in PNG and the company’s two listed sharehold-
ers contained potentially damaging media coverage.
[2006]
BHP Billiton was not only able to avoid future economic lia-
bility for the environmental impact of the Ok Tedi mine but it
also evaded public scrutiny of its continuing moral respon-
sibility for the lives of the people affected by the mine.26
The second lawsuit against BHP Billiton and OTML was
settled out of court in 2004 without changing the environ-
mental status quo (Kirsch 2004b; Munro 2004). At the time
of the settlement, the majority of the people living down-
stream from the Ok Tedi mine had already opted out of the
legal action to receive additional compensation through the
CMCAs. However, some of the remaining plaintiffs opposed
the settlement of their case. They expressed their objections
in notices sent to the Victorian Supreme Court: “Can your
Honour tell us who will be responsible for the environmen-
tal damage that has been caused?” (Katut et al. 2004:2). They
challenged the basis of the settlement, asking: “Where is the
evidence that the Companies have complied with all [of the]
environmental standards of the state of Papua New Guinea
and [with] international standard[s]? Where is the evidence
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that the water is safe to drink? Where is the evidence that
there is no factual or scientific proof of environmental degra-
dation?” (Dakop et al. 2004:2). They challenged claims that
the case was simply about gaining additional compensa-
tion from the mine, “BHP/OTML has deceitfully diverted
the minds of the people and the Papua New Guinea Govern-
ment from the real issue—the effects of the mine pollution
and the cleaning of the river system—to false monetary en-
tertainment” (Moken 2004:1). They pleaded with the courts
for sympathy, “Your Honour, we pray that this Honourable
Supreme Court may save our lives in the type of decision or
verdict that is favourable to us” (Katut et al. 2002:2), but they
remained defiant: “We will not be intimidated by the Com-
pany nor succumb to their bully tactics” (Dakop et al. 2004:2).
However, by approving the settlement agreement, the courts
rejected the plaintiffs’ final attempt to receive justice from
the Australian legal system.
The lack of significant expenditure on environmental
controls at the Ok Tedi mine allows the mining company to
operate “with profit margins running at an astonishing 60%”
(Garnaut 2004). Annual profits before taxes are expected to
average more than $250 million during the remaining years
of the mine, which is currently scheduled to close in 2013.
Although the second court case also failed to stop the mine
from polluting the river, the total dividends paid to the PNG
Sustainable Development Program, Ltd., may amount to
$1 billion.
Representations of the campaign
The political and legal opposition to the environmental im-
pact of the Ok Tedi mine was never an antimining campaign.
The participants sought fair compensation for the damages
they had incurred as a result of the operation of the mine.
They also wanted to receive the development opportunities
promised by the mine, although not at any cost, and cer-
tainly not at the cost of their economic autonomy through
the destruction of the environment on which their subsis-
tence practices depend. During the initial legal proceedings
from 1994 to 1996, the Yonggom and their neighbors never
called for the Ok Tedi mine to close. Their objective was to
modify the relationship between the mine and the environ-
ment through tailings containment, and to transform their
relations with the mining company through the payment of
appropriate levels of compensation. However, the mining
company rejected their demands, claiming that production
at the mine only remained economically viable with contin-
ued use of riverine tailings disposal. The state continued to
embrace the colonial model of development in which the
sacrifice of the river system was accepted as a fair trade for
the economic benefits that it received from the mine. The
state also discouraged the mining company from making
additional expenditures on environmental controls on the
grounds that it would be forced to pay double for them, once
in terms of reduced dividends from its shares in the mine and
a second time in terms of decreased tax revenue (Warren
Dutton, personal communication, 1996).27
The campaign against the Ok Tedi mine received con-
siderable attention in Australia, where BHP was incorpo-
rated and the court case was heard. Writing about mining in
Australia, Francesca Merlan (2004) observes that the views
of indigenous communities and developers are generally
presented as though they are diametrically opposed. Repre-
sentations of Aboriginal attitudes toward the environment
emphasize the symbolic, the meaningful, and the sacred,
leading to the assumption that Australian Aborigines are
opposed to development (Merlan 2004:246).28 In contrast,
mainstream Australian views of the environment are rep-
resented as pragmatic, economic, and managerial. The ex-
pressive is contrasted with the instrumental, even though the
indigenous peoples involved in this comparison do not nec-
essarily make this distinction themselves (Merlan 2004:246).
The opposition also ignores the practical and economic con-
cerns of Aboriginal Australians who seek to balance their de-
sire to escape poverty with the responsibility to protect their
“country” (Strang 2004:218).
Public opinion in Australia was generally sympathetic to
the Yonggom and their neighbors and critical of BHP for the
environmental damage downstream from the mine. How-
ever, the perspectives of many expatriates employed by the
mining industry in Papua New Guinea had a very different
inflection.29 They were more apt to represent landowners
in Papua New Guinea as economic opportunists, motivated
primarily by their desire to maximize the resource rents paid
by the mining company (Filer 1997; Toft 1997). This point of
view was reflected in a joke told to the participants at a 1995
conference on investment in the Papua New Guinea miner-
als and petroleum industries: If Jesus were living in Papua
New Guinea today, the story went, and Judas were to betray
him for 30 pieces of silver, it would be nearly impossible to
find a landowner who would blame him for taking the money.
The crowd roared with laughter, embracing the stereotype
of the greedy and immoral landowner (Kirsch 1997a:144).
Australian academics initially questioned the sincer-
ity of the campaign against the mine and the severity of
the environmental problems downstream from the Ok Tedi
mine (see Kirsch 1997b:128–130). Popular perceptions of in-
digenous movements are often influenced by the stereo-
type of the “ecologically noble savage,” which leads to es-
sentialist representations that assert a primordial closeness
between indigenous peoples and nature, including the as-
sumption that indigenous peoples are committed to sustain-
able resource use (Redford 1991). Although both activists
and environmental organizations have exploited this im-
age for their own purposes, indigenous peoples have been
unfairly criticized for their failure to live up to the envi-
ronmental standards that others have imagined for them
(Conklin and Graham 1995). The (1991) critique of the
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stereotype of the “ecologically noble savage” has also con-
tributed to scholarly backlash in which anthropological ac-
counts that attribute anything other than political or eco-
nomic value to the environment risk being discredited as
romanticism or invented traditions (see Keesing 1989).30
As Brosius notes, the focus on essentialisms has led an-
thropologists to ignore the “discursive moves of those who
would deny any sense of enchantment with nature whatso-
ever, putting in its place ‘commonsense’ solutions promot-
ing passionless, technoscientifically based management ini-
tiatives that elide every trace of politics or that reduce every
form of engagement with nature to an extension of capital”
(1999:281). Academic criticism of indigenous environmental
concerns is the structural counterpart to the strategic essen-
tialisms deployed by indigenous peoples and environmental
NGOs.
Although the destructive environmental consequences
of the Ok Tedi mine are now beyond dispute, some schol-
ars continue to challenge the legitimacy of Melanesian con-
cerns about the environmental impacts of mining. Martha
Macintyre and Simon Foale argue that the people living near
the Lihir gold mine in Papua New Guinea “embrace the
discourses of environmentalism and impending ecological
catastrophe primarily to use them as leverage in negotia-
tions with the mining company over higher payments to a
broader constituency” (2004:249). They support their claims
by presenting a straw man argument that Melanesianists are
not conservationists. They criticize Lihirians for continuing
to catch sea turtles even though the species is endangered
(Macintyre and Foale 2004:234), although they do not dis-
cuss the mine’s impact on a local turtle nesting area (Andy
Markham, personal communication, 2000; Sydney Morning
Herald 2002). They note that local nostalgia for a marsupial
that was hunted to extinction is limited to the fact that it was
good to eat (Macintyre and Foale 2004:235). They also criti-
cize Lihirians for asking the mining company to help them
address an infestation of Giant African Snails rather than
tackling the problem themselves, although many Lihirians
reasoned that the mine was indirectly responsible for the sit-
uation because it had increased the trade and traffic between
the islands (Macintyre and Foale 2004:240). Finally, they note
that when Lihirians negotiate with the mining company, they
demand increased compensation rather than stricter envi-
ronmental controls (Macintyre and Foale 2004:234).
However, many indigenous peoples who practice sub-
sistence hunting and fishing have relationships with animals
that are predicated on their continued interaction, rather
than the segregation of people and animals, as Western con-
servationists often insist (Nadasdy 2003; Rose 1996). Anthro-
pologists have also noted the general Melanesian tendency
to invoke long chains of liability for problems like the giant
snail infestation (Akin 1999; Kirsch 2001b). The capacity to
act collectively in New Guinea is often limited by political
fragmentation, and the initiative to respond to the threat
posed by the invasive snails may also have been reduced by
what psychologists call the diffusion of responsibility. Even
Americans who express strong environmental values often
fail to act on them (Kempton et al. 1996). Finally, although
my own experiences on Lihir are limited (Kirsch 2001b), peo-
ple in other parts of Papua New Guinea do regularly call on
mining companies to reduce their environmental impacts.
Macintyre and Foale (2004:249) argue that Lihirian com-
plaints about the environmental impacts of mining repre-
sent efforts to increase resource rents rather than legitimate
expressions of concern.31 They assume that one necessarily
precludes the other, rather than the possibility that claims
for compensation may be related to concerns about environ-
mental damage, real or imagined. However, as the following
letter to the editor of the National of Papua New Guinea
about the Lihir mine makes clear, the desire for development
and environmental concerns may be expressed simultane-
ously and without contradiction:
Though I welcome all the good things that Lihir Gold
has brought to the island . . . I am saddened by the fact
that very little is being said about the extent of the en-
vironmental damage being caused by the dumping of
mine tailings in the ocean. . . . I understand from media
reports that [several new mining projects have been pro-
posed for the region]. Though I welcome these two new
mining developments, I am also concerned over the fu-
ture potential damage to the marine resources which
have sustained our livelihood from time immemorial. I
urge the elected leaders at all levels of government . . .
[to] start asking some tough questions about the en-
vironmental impact of . . . mining on our marine re-
sources by the dumping of the mine tailings in the ocean.
[Kulmat 2005]
As Catherine Coumans (2004) observes, Macintyre and Foale
fail to consider how indigenous views on mining and the en-
vironment are shaped by the “complex longings, dreams, and
choices” of peoples living in the margins of the global econ-
omy. Instead, Macintyre and Foale (2004:237) extend their
straw man argument to its logical conclusion, claiming that
pollution has become a valuable and desired commodity for
Melanesians.32
There are a number of reasons why representations
of Aboriginal Australians are predicated on a dichotomiz-
ing view of radical difference, whereas representations of
Papua New Guineans in these mining disputes seem to
follow what Marshall Sahlins (1995:13) calls the substitu-
tion of bourgeois economic realism for cultural analysis.
Some factions of the Australian academy may be seeking
to reprise their colonial role in Papua New Guinea through
their attention to governmentality and resource manage-
ment, in contrast to the Australian commitment to reconcili-
ation with its own Aboriginal populations (Macintosh 2002).
Anthropologists may project the figure of the calculating
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and aggressively entrepreneurial Melanesian “Big Man” onto
the leaders of these campaigns, despite the critique of its
overgeneralization (Godelier and Strathern 1991). These at-
titudes may also have been influenced by the way that Papua
New Guinean activists downplayed the visible signs of cul-
tural difference in their campaign against the Ok Tedi mine.
In contrast to Amazonian activists, whose colorful and dra-
matic protests have become the paradigm for indigenous
activism (Conklin 1997; Turner 1991), the key figures in the
campaign against BHP did not dress up in ritual attire or mo-
bilize public attention through ritual theater.33 When they
demonstrated at the annual shareholder meetings of BHP
in downtown Sydney, they wore campaign T-shirts, shouted
slogans, and posed for photographs beside a display of dead
fish.
Property versus subsistence
Rabinow’s (2002:14) observation that the politics of transna-
tional corporations and NGOs may be based on shared con-
cepts is well taken. In the Ok Tedi case, however, the concept
of “subsistence rights” was proposed as an alternative to the
Euro-American concept of “property.” Because the Supreme
Court of Victoria was unable to hear claims regarding dam-
age to property located outside of its territorial jurisdiction,
lawyers for the plaintiffs focused on the mine’s impact on
subsistence resources. This was a novel claim given that the
common law ordinarily operates in terms of economic dam-
age to property. Yet the judge concluded that people could
not be deprived of their rights simply because the damages
do not take monetary form, establishing an important legal
precedent regarding subsistence use of resources (Gordon
1997:154–155).
Negotiations between the mining company and the
communities living downstream also reached an impasse
over the question of property versus subsistence rights dur-
ing the implementation of the 1996 settlement agreement.
The mining company initially refused to pay compensa-
tion to people who were not landowners but nonetheless
had local resource rights downstream from the mine where
damage had occurred. Lawyers for BHP argued that there
is no provision in common law for the payment of com-
pensation for damages to persons who are not the right-
ful property owners. This proposal would have excluded a
substantial number of persons who previously made use
of the land and resources in question. When the lawyers
for the paintiffs asked me to assist with the implementation
of the settlement, I was able to convince the mining company
to change its position, and consequently the rights of both
“land owners” and “land users” were included in subsequent
agreements between the mine and the affected communi-
ties. With the passage of the Ninth Supplemental Agreement
in 2001, these categories were given legal status, formally
recognizing subsistence rights (Kirsch 2002b).
Criticism of the CMCAs also addressed questions about
customary property rights in Papua New Guinea. The
CMCAs authorized any “person representing or purporting
to represent a Community or clan” to bind its members to
the agreement “notwithstanding . . . that there is no express
authority for that person to sign or execute the Commu-
nity Mine Continuation Agreement on behalf of the mem-
bers of the Community or clan concerned” (Independent
State of Papua New Guinea 2001:8). This legally committed
the members of the signatory’s village to the agreement re-
gardless of whether their consent was appropriately secured.
The members of future generations were similarly bound
by the agreement (Independent State of Papua New Guinea
2001:8).
However, the political authority of elected or appointed
officials in contemporary villages may not be compatible
with customary land tenure systems recognized by Papua
New Guinea law. Decisions concerning land held under cus-
tomary tenure must incorporate the views of all persons who
have rights to the land in question. In contrast to landown-
ers, village representatives acquire their political authority
from the government or other electoral processes. They lack
authority over the disposition of land, which may be held by
individuals in association with particular lineages or clans
rather than by a village or community as a whole. Given
that the CMCAs are fundamentally concerned with dam-
age to local land and rivers, they necessarily invoke cus-
tomary land rights. Village representatives, even if demo-
cratically elected, lack the authority to bind other persons
to decisions affecting the disposition of their land. Accord-
ing to customary land tenure law in Papua New Guinea,
the signatories to the CMCAs lacked the authority to com-
mit the other members of their village or community to
the agreement. The constitutionality of the CMCAs is cur-
rently being challenged in the Supreme Court of Papua New
Guinea by lawyers representing the governor of Western
Province.
Discussions about subsistence resources continue to
dominate postsettlement debates, reflecting concerns about
daily consumption needs and the importance of compensa-
tion payments in subsidizing local livelihoods in a degraded
ecosystem. The general theme of this discussion has been
the insufficiency of the compensation payments given the
magnitude of the losses that the people living along the Ok
Tedi and Fly rivers have experienced.34 As one of my infor-
mants explained the dilemma, “This is the only land we have;
there are no other places. We should be compensated for the
value that the land has for us.” He contrasted the value of
land for people who live in an economy based on commod-
ity production in which food is procured from stores or the
company cafeteria and for people who live and work in a sub-
sistence economy: “The company doesn’t face this problem.
They eat in the mess, while we live on hunting and garden-
ing. We cannot afford to buy fresh meat from the stores.”35
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He concluded that “they [the mining company] should re-
consider how much our land is worth.”
Whereas the court case turned on the question of
subsistence rights, the remedy was framed in monetary
terms. Monetization operates through a “logic that reduces
all qualitative distinctions to mere quantitative differences,
a logic that, as it were, attempts to ‘bottom line’ the world”
(Rappaport 1993:299). As Rabinow suggests, the way that
political struggles are framed by language and practices
common to both sides may set limits on indigenous
movements. The Yonggom continue to struggle with this
predicament, recognizing that monetary “compensation
cannot be a substitute for a means for survival” (Maun
1997:117). This is also recognized in an expression that has
recently become popular among the Yonggom, that “sago is
life,” referring to their primary staple, which is derived from
the pith of sago palm trees, and how it cannot be replaced
by rice or other food that one can buy in a store. It does
not help matters that the province has not demonstrated
the capacity to invest or spend its share of the economic
benefits from the mine wisely (Burton 1998), or that cash
compensation payments are associated with increased
alcohol consumption (National HIV/AIDS Support Project,
Papua New Guinea 2005:21).36
The consequences of counterglobalization
The indigenous campaign against the environmental impact
of the Ok Tedi mine followed the formula for counterglob-
alization. Its leaders participated in the rituals of the courts
and learned how to manage a press conference. Like ethnog-
raphers tracking global commodity chains, they followed the
movement of copper ore from Mount Fubilan to smelters in
Germany and Japan.37 Yonggom activists became temporary
heroes of Melbourne’s green community and celebrities on
the global NGO circuit (Filer 1997). They had mobility, atten-
tion of the media, and deft legal counsel able to outmaneuver
its sluggish corporate counterparts.
Their timing was also fortuitous: The 1990s was the UN
“Decade of Indigenous Peoples” and the Yonggom and their
neighbors readily found common cause with environmen-
talists fighting to save the world’s rain forests (Conklin and
Graham 1995). They challenged an industry that is strongly
associated with Australian national identity (Rose 1999) and
is thus especially vulnerable to public criticism. Shares in
BHP were widely held by organizations sensitive to ethi-
cal concerns, including churches and teachers unions. The
campaign against the Ok Tedi mine was also photogenic: Im-
ages of the polluted Ok Tedi River broadcast on Australian
television were devastating. BHP was a vulnerable target for
counterglobalization.
Once operating with impunity, mining companies have
begun to look over their shoulders, revising their policies
to take into account the new and unexpected threat of
the indigenous striking back. Recognizing that their critics
have become “more powerful and vocal,” the world’s largest
mining companies established the Global Mining Initiative,
which sponsors research and conferences on mining, com-
munities, and the environment so that the industry can more
effectively engage its critics (Anonymous A 2001). The Cana-
dian mining company Placer Dome began to issue sustain-
ability reports on its projects in the Pacific, arguing that
mining contributes to sustainability by sponsoring devel-
opment projects that continue to operate after mine clo-
sure (Placer Dome Asia Pacific 2000).38 The discourse of sus-
tainability has become an industry standard (International
Council on Mining and Metals 2005:8–9; International In-
stitute for Environment and Development 2002).39 Mining
companies now recognize that they may be held legally ac-
countable for future environmental catastrophes, and this
realization has begun to affect their policies, such as BHP
Billiton’s announcement that it will no longer use riverine
tailings disposal in any new projects (Paul 2000).
The Ok Tedi campaign and related political movements
have enabled communities affected by mining projects to
participate in negotiations that were previously limited to re-
source developers and states (Ballard and Banks 2003; Kirsch
2002a). Whether in Canada, New Caledonia, or Peru, min-
ing companies now acknowledge that they require a “so-
cial license” to operate from the affected communities (Salas
Carreño n.d.). These mining campaigns have also provided
support for new rights-based claims, including legal protec-
tion for the subsistence practices of indigenous peoples, and
the protection of sacred sites as cultural property or national
heritage.
Transnational action networks also establish new paths
and routes for the sharing of tactics, strategies, and expe-
riences among indigenous peoples and other communities
affected by mining, as exemplified by the meeting of the
Yonggom representative with members of the Dene Nation
in Canada. One of the messages that he brought back to
Papua New Guinea was that land should be inalienable, a
concern expressed in relation to a mining company plan
to purchase land for waste disposal. In the past, large-scale
alienation of land was not possible and many people had
not fully considered the implications of selling off their land
or losing access to it because of the disposal of hazardous
wastes. The direct exchange of information and experiences
among peoples who are marginal to the global economy
(Appadurai 2002:42) is especially valuable for the leaders of
indigenous movements given the steep learning curves in-
volved in many of their campaigns. Surprising alliances have
also resulted from these interactions. In northern Wisconsin,
Native groups and sports fishermen who previously had
antagonistic relations successfully collaborated in block-
ing the development of a proposed zinc and copper mine
(Gedicks and Grossman 2005; Grossman 2005); similar al-
liances between Native groups and ranchers have limited the
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expansion of coal mining in the northern Plains (Grossman
2003).
Conclusion
In November 2005, more than 300 people representing many
of the communities downstream from the Ok Tedi mine gath-
ered in the town of Kiunga to discuss their future. The lawsuit
had acted like a funnel for political participation, reducing
the number of key players to a handful, and this meeting
was intended to share information and promote discussion
among a much broader political constituency.40
Looming on the horizon is a new environmental threat:
acid mine drainage, in which sulfuric acid leaches heavy
metals into the river system, rendering the affected areas
inhospitable to organic life for decades. Reports from the
mining company indicate that acid formation is already oc-
curring at low levels in the Ok Tedi River and the middle Fly
River and will increase in the future (OTML 2005:1–2).41 At
the same time, the now-independent Ok Tedi mine is rene-
gotiating the CMCAs and will provide additional monetary
compensation to the people in its catchment area. Once
again, the people living downstream from the mine are be-
ing forced to choose between environmental degradation
and monetary compensation.
The climax of the meeting occurred when one of the
speakers, using the call-and-response preaching style of
public speaking that has become popular, called out to the
participants, asking them, “Do you want the environment
or money?” Only a few people responded by saying “envi-
ronment.” There was a loud murmuring as the participants
discussed the question among themselves. Finally, someone
called out in Melanesian Pidgin, “Tupela wantaim!” or “Both
of them at once,” and the crowd loudly indicated its approval.
In other words, they want to simultaneously protect the en-
vironment and have access to development opportunities
and money. It is almost impossible for them to contemplate
early mine closure when so much of the regional economy
is dependent on its operation, and when so many of the vil-
lages have already been significantly affected by pollution
and need the extra income provided by compensation pay-
ments to feed their families.42 They cannot imagine letting
the mine close down without gaining some lasting form of
economic benefit in return for all the damage that it has done
to their environment.
The campaign against the Ok Tedi mine points to a fun-
damental paradox facing contemporary indigenous move-
ments: the need for collaboration with transnational ac-
tion networks. For political action against the Ok Tedi mine
to succeed, it had to internationalize to keep pressure on
BHP, which was expanding globally throughout the 1990s.
Although indigenous movements have the capacity to chal-
lenge the status quo, their incorporation into counterglob-
alization movements may limit their ability to alter the out-
come of the case at hand. When local political struggles
hitchhike on global initiatives, or when international cam-
paigns piggyback on specific struggles, their objectives may
be lost in translation and their efforts may end up subsidiz-
ing other political agendas.
A significant consequence of this paradox is that re-
liance on counterglobalization may reduce the outcome of
indigenous movements to a binary simplification of either/
or choices between the environment and development. This
problem is also reflected in the tendency within the anthro-
pological literature to focus on indigenous movements that
seek to veto development projects at the expense of indige-
nous movements that have more complicated agendas, such
as the promotion of development at a lower scale or inten-
sity or the imposition of stronger controls on development.
The campaign against the Ok Tedi mine, like many other in-
digenous movements, had a more complex objective than
simply closing down the mine. The movement sought com-
pensation for the damages to the environment and to limit
further pollution of the river. The participants in the move-
ment also hoped that the mine would continue to operate,
providing them with economic benefits and opportunities,
albeit not at the cost of the river and the surrounding rain
forest.
Even though the campaign and lawsuit against the Ok
Tedi mine tried to balance these two objectives, they were
often misinterpreted. Indigenous movements that deviate
from an antidevelopment framework run the risk of be-
ing seen as greedy rather than green. Instead of allegories
about environmental activism, anthropologists need ethno-
graphic accounts that better represent the complex and po-
tentially contradictory ambitions of indigenous movements.
Anthropologists also need to pay greater ethnographic atten-
tion to the ways in which states and their legal systems, cor-
porations, the media, and academics themselves represent
these campaigns and influence their outcomes, including
capital’s appropriation of the terms of its critique and the
strategies of its critics.
The campaign against the Ok Tedi mine failed to over-
come representations that reduced indigenous views to a
single dimension. Whereas in the Australian context, roman-
tic representations of indigenous perspectives privilege the
expressive and the symbolic, representations of the cam-
paign against the Ok Tedi mine emphasized the economic
and the instrumental. This resulted in legal recognition of
subsistence rights while simultaneously reducing concerns
about environmental degradation to a monetary logic fo-
cused on compensation. This kind of metric can be contin-
ually scaled-up in relation to the scope of the environmental
impact, potentially interfering with decision making on en-
vironmental grounds.
It might have been expected that capital would have
greater staying power than coalitions between NGOs and
indigenous peoples, which by comparison would be fragile
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or ephemeral. However, this was not the case in the cam-
paign against the Ok Tedi mine: The problems downstream
from the mine eventually proved too controversial for the
majority shareholder and managing partner, BHP Billiton,
which ultimately abandoned the project. However, the logic
of capital and economic pressure on the state prevented a
reworking of the calculus on which the continued operation
of the mine and the fate of the people living downstream de-
pend. Capitalist translations of environmental degradation
into monetary compensation obscured other ways in which
these debates might have been resolved. Even though the
participants in the campaign against the mine consistently
expressed their desires and ambitions throughout their long
campaign, and the original legal settlement clearly reflected
their dual objectives, the campaign ultimately lacked suffi-
cient power to determine the conditions downstream from
the mine. The Ok Tedi case did change the status quo, both in
terms of increasing the pressure on the mining industry to in-
ternalize the costs of social and environmental impacts that
were previously externalized (Gibson-Graham and O’Neill
2001), and in terms of the transfer of assets that may eventu-
ally be worth more than $1 billion. But the campaign failed
to overcome the opposition between development and the
environment, and its interventions were unable to save the
river.
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1. Arjun Appadurai asserts that a significant impediment to coun-
terglobalization movements is that “key actors in this process may
lack the means to produce a systematic grasp of the complexities
of globalization” (2000:18). In contrast, Marc Edelman argues that
Appadurai’s claim is “belied by a range of investigations from vari-
ous world regions that demonstrate levels of sophistication on the
part of grassroots activists that may exceed those of their elite an-
tagonists” (2001:306).
2. Tanya Li (2000) argues that access to resources and political
status strategically motivates claims to indigeneity, whereas Suzana
Sawyer (2004) shows how neoliberal policies transform corporations
into new sites of governance, contributing to the emergence of in-
digenous peoples as transgressive subjects. World Bank directives
that address indigenous rights also contribute to the proliferation
of claims to indigeneity.
3. Michael Dove observes that anthropological debates over the
category of the indigenous reveal the disciplinary struggle between
the “simple disavowal of politics and insistence on distance” and
“an explicit, subjective, moral positioning” (2006:202).
4. Negative experiences of discrimination (Niezen 2003) and loss
(Kirsch 2001a) have also been identified as factors that shape in-
digenous politics and identities.
5. Among the Innu of Newfoundland, “the knowledge that el-
ders and hunters have” is combined with scientific concepts that
enable “Innu leaders to deal with the dominant society on its own
terms and to challenge the ways in which science is pressed into ser-
vice by powerful interests” (Innes 2001:14). “Terms like ‘ecological
integrity,’ ‘biological diversity,’ and ‘cumulative effects’ are now fre-
quently used by Innu spokespeople . . . [who] have adapted and in-
corporated those aspects of science that make sense to them, while
contesting those aspects that do not” (Innes 2001:15).
6. In 1997, the influential management consultants Control Risks
Group reported to their corporate subscribers that they were left
with no choice but to respond to the pressure from NGOs, which
left transnational corporations “no hiding place” (Bray 1997:1–2).
7. The public relations film Mine Your Own Business (McAleer and
McElhinney 2006) borrows filmmaking tactics from Michael Moore’s
Fahrenheit 9/11 in its satirical treatment of environmentalists who
challenge the mining industry (Sydney Morning Herald 2006). Billed
as the first antienvironmentalist film, it was funded primarily by
Gabriel Resources, the Canadian mining company whose plan to
build an open cast gold mine in Rosia Montana, Romania, has been
delayed for environmental reasons (Sydney Morning Herald 2006).
8. See Kirsch (2004a:38–39, n. 23) for a critique of the use of alle-
gory as a substitute for history.
9. In this case, Tsing argues that “to imagine that [the logging
company] would take more social or environmental responsibility
in its logging of the remaining healthy forest—without even being
pressed—is wishful thinking” (2005:210–211).
10. The initial investors in the mine were Amoco (30 percent),
BHP (30 percent), a consortium of German companies (20 percent),
and the state of Papua New Guinea (20 percent).
11. In 2004, OTML exported approximately 600,000 dry met-
ric tons of copper concentrate, containing 165,000 tons of copper,
15,000 kilograms of gold, and 35,000 kilograms of silver. Export sales
in 2004 amounted to nearly $700 million, representing one-quarter
of Papua New Guinea’s total exports (OTML 2006).
12. Rex Dagi later explained that he was unsure what to say, so he
read portions of a paper that I had written, which was itself based
on village interviews.
13. Although Amoco’s 1993 sale of its 30 percent stake in OTML
was part of a shift in corporate strategy from economic diversifica-
tion back to its core business in petroleum (Cibin and Grant 1996),
the terms of the sale, which were not publicly disclosed but report-
edly included a waiver of future environmental liability, also suggest
other possible motives.
14. NGOs are not immune from strategic and financial pressure,
including competition for funding, which may lead them to behave
in ways belied by their commitment to liberal values (Cooley and
Ron 2002).
15. In 1991, 20 percent of OTML was controlled by the German
companies Metallgesellschaft AG, Degussa AG, and DEG (West
German Development Co.). Inmet, established in 1987 as a Cana-
dian subsidiary of Metallgesellschaft, but independent since 1994,
still controls 18 percent of OTML. Norddeutsche Affinerie, formerly
a partially owned subsidiary of Metallgesellschaft AG, continues to
process copper ore from the Ok Tedi mine.
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16. A second writ was filed simultaneously in the Papua New
Guinea courts.
17. The Ekati diamond mine in Yellowknife, Canada, opened in
1998 (BHP Billiton 2006). Despite their initially positive response
to the project, members of the Lutsel K’e Dene First Nation subse-
quently criticized the consultation process, the distribution of eco-
nomic benefits, and the social and environmental impacts of the
project (Weitzner 2006).
18. Mining companies often refer to areas affected by pollution
as “sacrifice zones.”
19. This comment was made despite the opening remarks of the
Governor General of Papua New Guinea, who urged the participants
to consider the experiences of people living in rural areas by mem-
orably suggesting that “we must learn to walk in the shoes of people
who have no shoes.”
20. As Gordon notes, “The Ok Tedi mine in Papua New Guinea
operates through statutorily enforced agreements between the PNG
government and the various joint venture partners in OTML (in-
cluding BHP), the first agreement having been entered into in 1976.
Seven supplemental agreements since then have taken account of
changes in conditions and financing” (1997:156). The Eighth Sup-
plemental Agreement established the general compensation fund
of K110 million prior to the settlement of the lawsuit in 1996 (Inde-
pendent State of Papua New Guinea 1995b); the Ninth Supplemental
Agreement legally executed a series of agreements between OTML
and the affected communities known as the Community Mine Con-
tinuation Agreements (CMCAs). It also approved BHP Billiton’s exit
from OTML and the transfer of its shares to the PNG Sustainable De-
velopment Program, Ltd. in Singapore (Independent State of Papua
New Guinea 2001).
21. The settlement called for the mining company to “commit as
soon as is practicable to the implementation of any tailings options
recommended by the independent enquiry or review to be con-
ducted by the State (the tailings option) providing BHP bona fide
considers that option to be economically and technically feasible”
(Banks and Ballard 1997: app. 1, p. 216).
22. A weakness of the settlement was that compensation was cal-
culated in Papua New Guinea kina, even though the mine sells cop-
per and gold for U.S. dollars on the international market. The deval-
uation of the kina from $0.75 in 1996 to $0.28 in 2001 substantially
reduced the value of the settlement.
23. A number of the legal claims in the United States have been
filed under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), including litigation
against the British mining company Rio Tinto for its alleged role in
the Bougainville civil war.
24. Australian mining companies use strategic comparisons be-
tween their own impacts and natural background rates to discount
the environmental consequences of their operations (McEachern
1995:59). For example, OTML regularly compared the volume of tail-
ings and other waste materials that it discharged into the Fly River to
the high sediment load transported by the nearby Strickland River
(McEachern 1995:58).
25. Two-thirds of the royalties earned by the PNG Sustainable
Development Program, Ltd., are invested in the “future genera-
tions fund,” which cannot be spent until after mine closure. The
remaining royalties are spent on development projects in Papua
New Guinea, one-third in Western Province where the mine is lo-
cated, and the other two-thirds elsewhere in the country. Access to
these funds provided the state with an economic incentive to ap-
prove the terms of BHP Billiton’s departure from Papua New Guinea.
26. As reported by the Australian Weekend, Tim Offor of Offor
Sharp is less concerned about the pollution downstream from the
mine than the growing dependency of the affected communities on
the mining company:
Australian consultant Tim Offor is frustrated that the com-
pany is so readily blamed by locals for their woes. Dur-
ing a recent visit to the village of Mipan, people com-
plained that [OTML] should replace a roof blown off
a school classroom built by the company. “In a village
with hundreds of fit men without a heck of a lot to do,
no one seemed to think that putting up a palm roof
might be a sensible solution,” he says. “They were too fo-
cused on what other people should do for them.” [Roberts
2006:27]
Building a palm roof would be considerably easier for the people
of Mipan if pollution from the mine had not already killed so many
sago palms in the middle Fly River region.
27. Warren Dutton, formerly Papua New Guinea Minister for Jus-
tice, was an advisor to the PNG government regarding the Ok Tedi
litigation from 1995 to 1996.
28. This applies more to the Aboriginal communities in north-
ern Australia than to the peoples of the more densely populated
south, whose territories have long been commodified and who con-
sequently make use of the land in ways that outsiders tend to inter-
pret in purely economic terms (see Bell 1998).
29. However, there are parallels with Aboriginal politics in the
more developed parts of southern Australia (Bell 1998).
30. Similarly, a BHP executive once complained to a colleague
employed by an environmental NGO in Australia that my work was
biased by “that ‘noble savage’ business.”
31. In a related vein, Banks advances the view that Melane-
sian concerns about the environmental impacts of mining are
better understood as a struggle for the “control over resources”
(2002:41).
32. In contrast, Nicholas Low and Brendan Gleeson argue that the
Ok Tedi case demonstrates that “there is a continual global auction
of the right to pollute and to destroy local environments. The poorer
the nation, the more dependent it is on capital inflow and the more
it is forced to bid away its environment” (1998:215).
33. These actions have a very different symbolic valence in Brazil,
where Indians comprise only 0.2 percent of the national popula-
tion (Ramos 1998:4), as compared to Papua New Guinea, which was
never a settler state.
34. In one of the affected communities, the 2004 compensation
payments averaged K120 per person annually, plus additional pay-
ments of K50 and K80 for damage to their gardens and the river. The
combined payments average about $6.00 per month (Matit 2005:43),
which does not stretch very far given the very high cost of basic com-
modities in Papua New Guinea. For example, at current prices in the
capital city of Port Moresby, 1 kilogram of rice costs approximately 3
kina ($1.00) and one can of tinned mackerel (known in Melanesian
Pidgin as tinpis) is about 2.5 kina ($0.85). Prices are significantly
higher in rural areas.
35. Despite Yonggom participation in the cash economy, the ma-
jority of the calories consumed in rural areas continued to be derived
from subsistence production until these resources were affected by
pollution from the mine.
36. Although it is important to note that problems with alcohol
consumption are also associated with wage labor and the mining
industry (National HIV/AIDS Support Project, Papua New Guinea
2005:38), and are largely independent of money in the case of “home
brew” (National HIV/AIDS Support Project, Papua New Guinea
2005:38).
37. In response to criticism, a spokesperson for the German com-
pany Norddeutsche Affinerie (NA), which buys copper from the Ok
Tedi mine, argued that “were NA to cease processing Ok Tedi con-
centrates, the same quantities [of copper] would be processed under
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substantially worse conditions . . . result[ing] in an additional strain
on the environment” (Mineral Policy Institute 2000).
38. The sustainability report produced by Placer Dome Asia Pa-
cific for the Porgera mine in Papua New Guinea indicated that the
primary objective of sustainability was “to maintain profitability for
the mine life for shareholder and stakeholder financial benefits,” al-
though it also sought “to develop closer integration as a partner and
contributor in community development,” “to leave an environment
that offers no loss of opportunities to future generations after mine
closure,” and “to contribute in the socio-economic development of
the impact area” (2000:3).
39. See Anonymous B (2005) for an insider critique of the mining
industry’s appropriation of the discourse of sustainability.
40. I convened the Western Province summit meeting after the
settlement of the second lawsuit in 2004 left the political opposition
to the mine’s environmental practices in disarray. The Mineral Pol-
icy Institute in Sydney arranged for funding from DKA Austria and
IUCN Netherlands, and the members of ENECO, a Kiunga-based
NGO, organized and facilitated the meeting. Kerry Ard, a graduate
student at the University of Michigan, and Teddy Kisch, a senior at
the University of California, Berkeley, produced handouts on envi-
ronmental issues for the participants.
41. The mining company is currently evaluating a plan to build a
flotation plant that would reduce the pyrite content of the tailings re-
leased into the river, which causes acid mine drainage. The resulting
concentrate would be piped to the lower Ok Tedi River and stored
there. The cost of constructing and operating these facilities, the
success of which is not guaranteed, is expected to be approximately
$250 million (Riseborough 2006).
42. The question of early mine closure is also complicated by the
very different interests of the communities that live in the mountains
surrounding the mine site, which receive economic benefits from
the mine but are not exposed to its negative environmental impacts
like the communities living downstream (see Jorgensen 2006).
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